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 Cunningham v. California: The U.S. Supreme Court 
Painted Into a Corner  
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION   
 
The framers of the Constitution wished to avoid the judicial 
oppression resulting from ―arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary 
convictions,‖1 and thus, resolved to protect the role of the jury in 
criminal cases.
2
 Yet, today, the ―land of the free‖ has the highest per 
capita incarceration rate in the world with over two million men and 
women filling America‘s jails.3 Constitutional scholars have voiced 
concern that the recent ―explosion in Supreme Court litigation‖ 
concerning the jury‘s constitutional role in determining sentences4 has 
failed to remedy what seems to be a relentless incarceration epidemic.
5
 
Indeed, at a time when clear and unequivocal solutions to the nation‘s 
―imprisonment binge‖ are vital,6 the Supreme Court‘s body of sentencing 
law remains ―confusing,‘ incoherent, [and] formalistic.‖7 
In Cunningham v. California, the United States Supreme Court had 
an opportunity to create a comprehensive rule which would ―bring order 
out of chaos‖8 and to formulate a coherent rule which would complement 
the relationships between ―judicial fact-finding, judicial sentencing 
discretion, and appellate review.‖9 While the Cunningham decision is 
relatively recent, it has already incited a wide span of reactions,
10
 and 
 
 1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238–39 (2005) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, 
at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton. Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 3. Robert Batey, The Costs of Judicial Restraint: Forgone Opportunities to Limit America’s 
Imprisonment Binge, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29, 29 (2007). 
 4. John Gleeson, Seventeenth Annual Supreme Court Review: October 2004 Supreme Court 
Term: The Road to Booker and Beyond: Constitutional Limits on Sentence Enhancements, 21 
TOURO L. REV. 873, 873 (2006) (explaining the explosion in terms of the ―limits placed by the 
Constitution . . . on legislatiures‘ power to direct sentencing outcomes‖). 
 5. Batey, supra note 3, at 30 (arguing that the Court has missed important opportunities to 
limit the nation‘s ―imprisonment binge‖); see also Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making 
Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37 (2006). 
 6. Batey, supra note 3, at 29. 
 7. Berman & Bibas, supra note 5, at 37. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Frank O. Bowman, “The Question Is Which Is To Be Master—That’s All”: Cunningham, 
Claiborne, Rita, and the Sixth Amendment Muddle, 19 FED. SENTENCING REP. R. 155, *2 (2007). 
 10. Id. (noting the Court‘s failure from Apprendi to Cunningham to formulate a coherent 
rule). But see United States v. Griffin, 494 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D. Mass. 2007) (arguing that 
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does not appear to provide the hoped for relief from the hopeless disorder 
of United States sentencing law. 
The Cunningham Court held that California‘s Determinate 
Sentencing Law (DSL) violated the defendant‘s Fourteenth Amendment 
due process rights and the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
jury because it allowed the trial judge to elevate Cunningham‘s sentence 
based on judge-found facts.
11
 Some argue that the Cunningham Court 
reinforced the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury by requiring that 
the maximum sentence a judge can impose be determined only by jury-
found facts.
12
 However, Cunningham‘s impact on the right to trial by 
jury is at best obscure and most likely damaging.
13
 Indeed, the Court‘s 
remedy to this constitutional violation was to allow the California 
legislature to choose whether to grant judges unregulated discretion in an 
indeterminate sentencing system or fully restrict them to the statutory 
range authorized by the jury verdict.
14
 
The Court‘s invalidation of California‘s DSL was correct because 
each defendant‘s sentence should fall within the appropriate range 
defined by the legislature and as reflected in the jury verdict.
15
 Failing to 
maintain this standard would result in the erosion of the jury‘s role in the 
judicial system, effectively making juries ―low-level gatekeep[ers].‖16 
However, Cunningham‘s inadequate remedial portion leads to 
inconsistencies and threatens to inflict substantial negative effects on 
determinate sentencing legislation and the Sixth Amendment right to trial 
by jury. To make matters worse, Cunningham‘s relationship to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines paints the Supreme Court into a corner 
where it will inevitably be forced in future decisions to either offend the 
Sixth Amendment or destroy the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
17
 
In Part II, this note will provide a brief historical background of the 
right to trial by jury, California‘s DSL, and the major decisions leading 
up to Cunningham. In Part III and IV, this note will discuss the 
background of Cunningham and its three separate opinions. In Part V, 
this note will conclude by analyzing (1) why the Court reached the 
correct conclusion, (2) the logical inconsistencies of Cunningham in 
relation to the Supreme Court‘s recent precedent and the possible 
 
Cunningham clarifies the Sixth Amendment analysis). 
 11. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 860 (2007) 
 12. Griffin, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
 13. See infra accompanying text 18–20. 
 14. Bowman, supra note 9, at *15 (arguing that the rule is inadequate which grants ―judges 
absolute sentencing discretion or none at all.‖). 
 15. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243–44 (1999). 
 16. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005) (citation omitted). 
 17. See infra Part V.C. 
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influence it will have on determinate sentencing, and (3) Cunningham‘s 
relation to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and reasonableness review. 
 
 II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND   
  
 A.  Right to Trial by Jury  
 
The Magna Carta signed by King John in 1215 A.D. provided, ―No 
Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised [sic] . . . nor will 
we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his 
Peers, or by Law of the Land.‖18 These phrases would later become 
essential components of American jurisprudence under the titles of ―right 
to trial by jury‖ and ―due process of law.‖19 The Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution states, ―In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury.‖20 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that no state shall ―deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.‖21 These words have been the 
center of major legal debates throughout the twentieth century.
22
 
The right to trial by jury has been described as the ―spinal column of 
American democracy‖ and the ―grand bulwark of [the Englishman‘s] 
liberties.‖23 The Founders of the Constitution took great pains to vest the 
power to prosecute criminals in the people through the vehicle of the jury 
rather than the State
24
 because ―in the criminal arena, government power 
is at its zenith and poses the greatest threat to personal liberty.‖25 In fact, 
―[o]ne of the indictments of the Declaration of Independence against 
King George III‖ was his deprivation ―in many Cases, of the Benefits of 
Trial by Jury.‖26 ―Trial by jury‖ appears in the Constitution in two 
sections.
27
 The right to trial by jury has been characterized as ―one of the 
least controversial rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights‖ as evidenced by 
 
 18. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378–79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that King John 
signed a Magna Carta with substantially similar language) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 19. Id. at 378 (explaining that ―‗[d]ue process of law‘ was originally used as a shorthand 
expression for governmental proceedings according to the ‗law of the land.‘‖). 
 20. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 22. Winship, 397 U.S. at 378 (Black, J., dissenting); see Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
235–36 (1940). 
 23. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (alternation in original) (citation omitted). 
 24. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 25. Berman & Bibas, supra note 5, at 42. 
 26. Neder, 527 U.S. at 42 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 
1776)). 
 27. Winship, 397 U.S at 377 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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its inclusion in the very organization of our government.
28
 Proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt is ―[e]qually well founded‖ in American 
jurisprudence.
29
 However, United States courts have traditionally 
recognized that ―the Sixth Amendment permits the court to base [a] 
sentence on its own factual findings.‖30 
 
 B.  Indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing Laws  
 
Indeterminate sentencing schemes, in which trial courts have 
unfettered discretion to select a proper sentence within a range restricted 
by the legislature, was the exclusive method of sentencing in the United 
States until the 1970s.
31
 For the past three decades, numerous states have 
enacted determinate sentencing schemes
32
 in an effort to promote greater 
uniformity in sentencing.
33
 Some scholars have criticized the guidelines 
as ―draconian sentencing regimes‖34 and have attributed the increase in 
the inmate population to such laws.
35
 Each of these schemes are 
different, but there are three broad categories: (1) mandatory minimum 
sentences, (2) lengthening of a maximum sentence based on defendant‘s 
prior convictions, and (3) lengthening of a maximum sentence based on 
facts other than prior convictions.
36
 Under these sentencing laws, a judge 
will perform fact-finding, typically by a preponderance of the evidence, 
after the defendant has been convicted by the jury and use his or her 
judicial discretion in selecting the proper sentence based on those 
additional facts. 
 
 C.  California’s Determinate Sentencing Law  
 
California‘s Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL) permitted trial 
courts to impose three terms of imprisonment: a lower, middle, or upper 
term. California Penal Code § 1170(b) declared ―the court shall order 
 
 28. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 3; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 29. Aprendi, 530 U.S. at 478; see also Winship, 397 U.S. at 361. 
 30. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 874 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 
(2004); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481). 
 31. Batey, supra note 3, at 37. 
 32. Id.; see Gleeson, supra note 4, at 873; see also Brief of Hawaii, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Illinois, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, and Utah as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007) (No. 05-6551), 2006 WL 1992876, at *12 (July 12, 
2006) [hereinafter Brief of Hawaii et al.]. 
 33. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 861. 
 34. Batey, supra note 3, at 29. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Gleeson, supra note 4, at 874. 
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imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.‖37 In a separate post-trial 
sentencing hearing, circumstances in aggravation or mitigation were 
determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence.
38
 Pursuant to 
their DSL statutory authority, the State Judicial Council defined 
―circumstances in aggravation‖ as ―facts which justify the imposition of 
the upper prison term.‖39 The rules provided a non-exhaustive list of 
circumstances in aggravation and gave judges free reign in considering 
additional factors that were relevant to the sentencing decision.
40
 Trial 
courts were permitted, though not obliged, to impose an upper or lower 
term.
41
 
 
 D.  Significant Supreme Court Decisions  
 
Beginning in 2000, the Supreme Court decided a line of cases on 
determinate sentencing that set an unfortunate stage for its Cunningham 
decision. Apprendi v. New Jersey, Blakely v. Washington
42
, and United 
States v. Booker
43
 created a smorgasbord of isolated case law.
44
 Apprendi 
stands for the proposition that any fact which raises the penalty above the 
statutory maximum must be found by a jury by a reasonable doubt 
standard in order to comport with the Sixth Amendment. In Blakely, the 
Court extended the Apprendi rule, indicating that the relevant statutory 
maximum that a trial court could impose without violating the Sixth 
Amendment was not the highest sentence within the entire statutory 
range, but rather, the highest sentence within the range which could be 
imposed based solely on the jury verdict.
45
 
In the lengthy two part opinion of Booker, the Court struggled to 
apply the formalistic rules it developed in Apprendi and Blakely to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
46
 Adding to the confusion, Justice 
Stevens, the author of the majority opinion in the first half of Booker 
analyzing the constitutionality of the Guidelines, joined the dissent in the 
remedial portion of the opinion.
47
 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 
 37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 2006) (amended 2007) (emphasis added). 
 38. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 860. 
 39. CAL. R. OF CT. 4.405(d) (2006) (amended May 23, 2007) (emphasis added). 
 40. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 862. 
 41. Id. at 865. 
 42. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, (2004). 
 43. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 44. Bowman, supra note 9, at 155. 
 45. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296. 
 46. Booker, 543 U.S. 220. 
 47. Id.; see Gleeson, supra note 4, at 886 (claiming ―Booker has created many more 
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developed in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 required federal judges 
to impose the upper term if the court found certain sentencing factors 
which warranted the imposition of the upper term.
48
 The Court found that 
this scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it required a shift in 
the sentencing range based on judge-found facts.
49
 The remedial portion 
of Booker attempted to remedy the violation of the Sixth Amendment by 
making the Guidelines ―advisory,‖ granting judges discretion to deviate 
from the Guidelines subject to appellate review for ―reasonableness.‖50 
 
 III.  BACKGROUND OF CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA  
 
A.  Facts 
 
Although Cunningham is the center of a raging legal debate in the 
area of criminal procedure, the facts of Cunningham are relatively 
straightforward. In January 2000,
51
 John Cunningham, a police officer,
52
 
lived with his ten year old son, referred to as John Doe, who had a 
history of falsely reporting parental abuse and neglect.
53
 Doe claimed 
that Cunningham perpetrated multiple acts of molestation, oral 
copulation, and sodomy against him and that these acts started shortly 
after he moved in with Cunningham.
54
 
Cunningham fervently denied Doe‘s accusations,55 although he 
admitted that on one occasion while they were in the shower together, 
Doe‘s mouth had made contact with his penis for five seconds.56 
Cunningham claimed that Doe fabricated these lies because he wanted to 
return to his mother‘s home and because he was also upset with 
Cunningham for disciplining him and expecting him do housework.
57
 
Cunningham also claimed that Doe was a manipulative liar and that Doe 
was a homosexual who was unable to stop his homosexual behavior.
58
 
 
questions than it answered‖). 
 48. Booker, 543 U.S. at 256–57. 
 49. Id. at 267. 
 50. Bowman, supra note 9, at *5. 
 51. People v. Cunningham, No. A103501, 2005 WL 880983, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 52. Id. at *7. 
 53. Id. at *1 (explaining that Doe falsely reported that his step father abused him and that his 
mother Wanda did not have enough food in the house). 
 54. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007) (No. 05-6551), 
2006 WL 1307511, at *7. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Cunningham, 2005 WL 880983, at *2. 
 57. Brief for Petitioner at 7–8, Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007) (No. 05-
6551), 2006 WL 1307511, at *7–8. 
 58. People v. Cunningham, No. A103501, 2005 WL 880983, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
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Cunningham was convicted by a jury of continuous sexual abuse of a 
child under fourteen.
59
 
 
 B.  Procedure  
 
During sentencing, the trial court, bound by California‘s DSL, held 
that the only mitigating factor in Cunningham‘s favor was that he had no 
prior record. However, the Court found five aggravating facts: (1) that 
Cunningham had acted with great violence, viciousness, and callousness; 
(2) that he posed a danger to the community; (3) that he had abused his 
status as a police officer and his position of trust as Doe‘s caregiver; (4) 
that Cunningham posed a threat of great bodily harm to the victim; and 
(5) that the victim was particularly vulnerable due to his age and 
dependence on his father.
60
 The Court held that the mitigating factors 
were outweighed by the aggravating factors and sentenced Cunningham 
to sixteen years in prison,
61
 which is the maximum term that can be 
imposed for such an offense under California‘s DSL.62 
The California Court of Appeal reviewed the trial court decision 
under the abuse of discretion standard
63
 and upheld the verdict 
concluding that the aggravating factors contemplated by California‘s 
DSL did not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury 
because a judge is authorized to impose the upper term based on ―‗facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.‘‖64 ‘‖One 
dissenting Justice disagreed with the Court‘s understanding of the Penal 
Code arguing that section 1170 mandated the imposition of the middle 
term unless the judge made additional findings of fact not inherent in the 
jury verdict.
65
 Consequently, the dissenting Justice found that the 
imposition of the sixteen-year term conflicted with Blakely and the 
Constitution.
66
 
The Supreme Court of California denied certiorari of Cunningham‘s 
appeal,
67
 but the Court addressed the constitutionality of California‘s 
 
 59. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 860. 
 60. Cunningham, 2005 WL 880983, at *7. 
 61. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 861. 
 62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5(a) (West 1999) (requiring that a person guilty under this 
provision ―shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 6, 12, or 16 years‖). 
 63. Cunningham, 2005 WL 880983, at *3; see also State v. Schofield, 895 A.2d 927, 
935 (Me. 2005) (noting the lack of agreement among jurisdictions as to the proper standard of 
review and that the majority of courts have applied the ―obvious or plain error‖ standard). 
 64. Cunningham, 2005 WL 880983, at *9 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 303 
(2004)). 
 65. Id. at *10 (Jones, J., dissenting and concurring). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 861 (2007). 
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DSL in People v. Black, a substantially similar case. In Black the Court 
recognized that the superficial language of the DSL appeared to lend 
support to the argument that the middle term was the statutory maximum 
a judge could impose without the finding of additional facts not inherent 
in the jury verdict. Nevertheless, the court held in a 6-1 majority that in 
―operation and effect,‖ the upper term was the relevant statutory 
maximum because the finding of additional facts by judges did not 
require the imposition of a higher term, but simply made the higher term 
reasonable.
68
 Ultimately, the Court held that California‘s DSL was in 
harmony with Apprendi,
69
 Blakely,
70
 and Booker
71
 and did not violate the 
defendant‘s Sixth Amendment rights.72 While agreeing with the Court‘s 
decision, a single dissenting Justice maintained that a jury, not a judge, 
should determine the existence of aggravating circumstances that would 
justify the imposition of the upper term. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
73
 to settle the 
split among various states
74
 regarding whether fact-finding by a judge 
that increases a sentence beyond that inherent in the jury verdict violates 
a defendant‘s trial by jury and due process rights protected by the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.
75
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68. Id. at 868 (quoting People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534, 543 (Cal. 2005)). 
 69. Black, 113 P.3d at 543 (submitting to the language in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 494 (2000), which indicates, ―the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect . . . .‖). 
 70. Id. at 546 (arguing that California‘s DSL is distinguishable from Washington‘s 
sentencing scheme which the Supreme court invalidated in Blakely because California‘s DSL grants 
a trial judge a greater level of discretion). 
 71. Id. at 548 (claiming that the level of discretion afforded to a California judge under the 
DSL is comparable to the post-Booker Federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
 72. Id. at 545; see Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 869. 
 73. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 865. 
 74. Gleeson, supra note 4, at 888–89 (noting that in State v. Schofield, 895 A.2d 927 (Me. 
2005), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reached the opposite result of the Supreme Court of 
California‘s decision in Cunningham); see also Thomson/West, Basing Upper Term of Sentence on 
Factor Not Found by Jury—Certiorari Granted, 23 NO. 6 WEST‘S CRIM. LAW NEWS 85, (Mar. 17, 
2006) (noting that Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, Indiana, and Oregon 
have held that fact-finding by a judge which imposes a sentence above the statutory maximum 
allowed by the jury verdict violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments while California, Hawaii, 
and Tennessee have allowed such fact-finding as long as the sentencing scheme grants the judge 
broad discretion). 
 75. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 860. 
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 IV.  THE DECISION  
 
A.  The Majority  
 
Justice Ginsburg penned Cunningham‘s 6-3 majority decision, 
holding that the trial court‘s sentence controlled by the California‘s DSL 
violated the defendant‘s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and 
the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury ―by placing 
sentence-elevating fact finding within the judge‘s province.‖76 The 
Court‘s analysis focused on the relationship between Cunningham, 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, emphasizing that each of them involved 
statutes which allowed facts found by a judge to extend a defendant‘s 
sentence.
77
 In conjunction with this analysis, the Court rebuked the Black 
Court for erroneously construing the Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker line 
of cases
78
 and for failing to apply the United States Supreme Court‘s 
clear precedent.
79
 
The Court reemphasized the rules it announced in Apprendi, Blakely, 
and Booker as follows: first, other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
―any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‖80 Second, ‗the relevant ―statutory maximum‖ is not 
the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, 
but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.‘‖81 
Third, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional to the 
extent that they mandate a court to increase a sentence based on facts 
found by a judge and not a jury.
82
 
In direct opposition to the construction of California‘s DSL given by 
the Supreme Court of California in Black, the United States Supreme 
Court construed the DSL as requiring a sentencing judge to begin with 
the middle term and to vary from that term only when the court finds 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 863–69; see also People v. Prince, 57 Cal.Rptr. 3d 543, 642 (Cal. 2007) (the 
Supreme Court of California responded to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Cunningham stating that 
―[t]he Cunningham decision involves merely an extension of the Apprendi and Blakely analyses to 
California‘s determinate sentencing law . . . .‖). 
 78. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871 (―The Black [C]ourt . . . construed this Court‘s decisions 
in an endeavor to render them consistent with California law.‖). 
 79. Id. at 869 (noting that the Black Court ―remarkably‖ stated that ―[t]he high court 
precedents do not draw a bright line‖). 
 80. Id. at 864 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
 81. Id. at 865 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 303–04 (2004)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 82. Id. at 857–58 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005)). 
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facts ―beyond the elements of the charged offense.‖83. The Court 
specifically discounted as irrelevant the Black Court‘s argument that 
California‘s DSL gave judges broader discretion than the Washington 
procedures invalidated in Blakely
84
 and held that through the precedent 
established in Blakely, the ―relevant statutory maximum‖ available to the 
sentencing judge was the middle term.
85
 Consequently, the Court found 
that the trial court‘s sentence in Cunningham violated Apprendi‘s 
―bright-line‖ rule because ―circumstances in aggravation‖ which 
increased Cunningham‘s sentence to the sixteen-year term had been 
found by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence.
86
 Finally, the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the Black Court‘s determination that California‘s 
DSL was substantially similar to the advisory post-Booker Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines because under the DSL, ―judges are not free to 
exercise their ‗discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined 
range.‘‖87 
Thus, in spite of the California Legislature‘s grant of power to the 
trial court to impose the upper limit upon the finding of aggravating 
facts,
88
 the United States Supreme Court ruled that both California‘s DSL 
and Cunningham‘s sixteen-year sentence violated the Constitution of the 
United States. Specifically, the Court concluded that the DSL violated 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments ―because a precondition for a 
sentence above the middle term was a post-conviction judicial finding of 
fact.‖89 As a result, the Court overruled the decisions of the trial court 
and the appellate court in Cunningham v. California
90
 and the decision of 
the Supreme Court of California in People v. Black.
91
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 83. Id. at 863; see also Respondent‘s Brief on the Merits, No. 05-6551, 2006 WL 1992877, at 
*19 (July 12, 2006) (failing to cite any case where a trial court imposed the upper term based on the 
jury verdict alone). 
 84. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 869 (―[B]road discretion to decide what facts may support an 
enhanced sentence . . . does not shield a sentencing system from the force of this Court‘s 
decisions.‖). 
 85. Id. at 868. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 870 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 233). 
 88. See United States v. Griffin, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 89. Bowman, supra note 9, at *1; see also Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871. 
 90. See People v. Cunningham, No. A103501, 2005 WL 880983 at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 91. See Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871. 
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 B.  Dissent: Alito  
 
Justice Alito filed a controversial
92
 dissenting opinion in which 
Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined.
93
 Alito noted that Booker rendered 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory and did not force a return to 
the ―pre-Guidelines federal sentencing system‖;94 instead, Booker 
instituted a ―reasonableness‖ standard of appellate review. Alito 
fervently argued that this ―reasonableness‖ standard would necessitate 
―sentencing judges to make factual findings and to base their sentences 
on those findings.‖95 Alito acknowledged the majority‘s accusation that 
his analysis went beyond the contours of Cunningham to predict future 
cases; however, he contended, ―We need not map all the murky contours 
of the post-Booker landscape in order to conclude that reasonableness 
review must mean something.‖96 He emphasized the ―very real constraint 
on a judge‘s ability to sentence across the full statutory range without 
finding some aggravating fact‖ despite the advisory nature of the 
Guidelines.
97
 
Alito then pointed to the similarities between California‘s DSL and 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines including the considerable level of 
discretion afforded to judges,
98
 the subjection to appellate review for 
reasonableness,
99
 and the requirement that sentencing judges find facts at 
sentencing not inherent in the jury verdict.
100
 Alito argued that 
California‘s DSL was ―indistinguishable in any constitutionally 
significant respect from the advisory Guidelines scheme that the Court 
approved in United States v. Booker.‖101 Alito also urged the Court to 
defer to the ―binding‖ construction of California‘s DSL promulgated by 
the Supreme Court of California in Black.
102
 
Thus, Justice Alito focused on the logical inconsistencies in the 
majority‘s reasoning and concluded that the majority could not hold 
 
 92. See Griffin, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 11 n.31 (D. Mass. 2007) (describing Justice Alito‘s 
remarks as ―paradoxical‖); but see Bowman, supra note 9, at *6 (stating, ―Justice Alito is right and 
Justice Ginsburg wrong . . . . .‖). 
 93. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 873 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 875. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 880 n.11. 
 97. Id. at 880; see also Bowman, supra note 9, at *4 (―[D]eclaring the Guidelines advisory 
does not alter the fundamental requirements of rational decision making.‖). 
 98. Id. at 876 (Alito J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 878. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 873. (Alito J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 878 n.8 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603 (2002), Wainwright v. Goode, 
464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983), Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)). 
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California‘s DSL to be inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment unless it 
overruled the Court‘s decision in Booker.103 
 
 C.  Dissent: Kennedy 
 
Though Justice Kennedy joined Justice Alito‘s dissent,104 he filed a 
separate dissenting opinion in which Justice Breyer joined.
105
 Kennedy 
iterated that certain sentencing factors are more appropriately determined 
by a judge rather than a jury because ―[j]udges . . . have a broad view and 
long-term commitment to correctional systems.‖106 He believed that 
Apprendi and its supportive cases remained incorrect and that the 
majority‘s decision extended Apprendi ―far beyond its necessary 
boundaries.‖107 Kennedy urged the Court to confine ―the Apprendi rule to 
sentencing enhancements based on the nature of the offense‖108 and that 
the Constitution ought to be interpreted to allow legislatures to guide 
judges in their sentencing determinations.
109
 He emphasized that the 
majority‘s decision would thwart reasonable efforts of state legislatures 
to develop favorable sentencing systems, which would provide greater 
uniformity in sentencing.
110
 
 
 V.  ANALYSIS  
 
The Supreme Court ruled correctly in Cunningham because the 
Court appropriately construed California‘s DSL111 and because the right 
to trial by jury should be protected.
112
 However, in the remedial portion 
of its opinion which requires states to choose between giving a judge 
unfettered discretionary sentencing power or no discretionary sentencing 
power, the Court strays onto a dark path that leads to an undesirable 
outcome.
113
 The Court‘s poor remedy will surely have negative 
repercussions for the determinate sentencing laws.
114
 Finally, 
Cunningham‘s relationship with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines sets 
 
 103. Id. at 881. 
 104. Id. at 873 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 872 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 872–73. 
 107. Id. at 872. 
 108. Id. at 872–73. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 862–63. 
 112. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 113. See Gleeson, supra note 4, at 890. 
 114. See generally Brief of Hawaii et al., supra note 32, at *12. 
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the Court on a collision course with Booker‘s reasonableness115 review 
which will in all likelihood trap the Court into offending either the Sixth 
Amendment or destroying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
116
 
 
 A.  Getting It Right 
 
Considering the egregious precedent
117
 and the Court‘s logical 
inconsistencies, the Court should be applauded for reaching the correct 
decision. The correct outcome of Cunningham depends entirely on the 
correct construction of California‘s DSL.118 Satisfying both a 
functionalist and formalist approach to statutory interpretation, the Court 
properly analyzed the DSL in light of traditional Sixth Amendment 
requirements. 
Here, the majority simply construed the DSL with greater expertise 
than the dissenting Justices by correctly emphasizing the statute‘s 
practical effects.
119
 By properly gauging the form and effect of the DSL, 
the U.S. Supreme Court discovered that judges rather than juries were 
finding facts leading to greater sentences. Under the Sixth Amendment, 
each defendant is entitled to a public trial by an impartial jury,
120
 and one 
of the most essential functions of a jury is fact-finding. Stripping this 
prerogative from the jury‘s domain would transform the jury‘s role in the 
criminal justice system from that of an impartial participant to an 
impartial observer.
121
 Such a construction would bypass the purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment. The Court‘s decision to overturn the DSL is 
correct because the effect of the DSL threatens, to some degree, the right 
to trial by jury—a constitutional right which the Court is charged with 
preserving. 
The Court also construed the DSL more impartially than the 
California Supreme Court.
122
 The Supreme Court of California argued 
that the DSL was constitutional in form and effect because it gave judges 
 
 115. Bowman, supra note 9, at *15 (stating that the ―Supreme Court has plunged Sixth 
Amendment sentencing law deep down the rabbit hole‖). 
 116. Id. at *6. 
 117. United States v. Griffin, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (noting that the Booker decisions were 
―internally irreconcilable‖). 
 118. See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 862 (2007) (holding that the DSL required 
the imposition of the middle term unless the court and not the jury found aggravating facts not 
inherent in the jury verdict); but see id. at 877 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the judge‘s 
discretion is ―quite broad‖ under the DSL to select the upper term). 
 119. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 120. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 121. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005). 
 122. People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534, 543 (Cal. 2005) (arguing that the relevant statutory 
maximum is the upper term). 
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broad discretion in selecting the upper term.
123
 However, gauging the 
true effect of the DSL is easily done by reviewing its application in case 
law. The State‘s counsel in Cunningham was unable to point to a single 
case in which a trial judge increased the sentence beyond the middle term 
without finding additional facts not contained in the jury verdict.
124
 In 
light of this reality, it is hard to believe that the California Supreme Court 
would claim the DSL is constitutional.
125
 
As outlined previously, Justice Kennedy‘s dissent argues that judges 
are in a better position to gauge the individual circumstances of each 
defendant that are not obvious to juries.
126
 As Kennedy explained, some 
sentencing facts should be determined by judges because they have a 
more ―broad view and long-term commitment to correctional 
systems.‖127 But while juries are known to be inefficient, cumbersome, 
and sometimes inaccurate, ―[t]he founders of the American Republic 
were not prepared to leave [criminal justice] to the State.‖128 In his 
concurring opinion in Apprendi, Justice Scalia explains that the right to 
trial by jury ―has never been efficient; but it has always been free.‖129 
Accordingly, the Court should not interpret the Constitution in conflict 
with this ideal. 
Respecting the Sixth Amendment tradition requires the strict 
protection of the right to trial by jury. By allowing a judge to impose 
greater sentences based on judge-found facts, the right to trial by jury 
would be operatively bypassed and slowly eroded. As far as the 
Cunningham decision is concerned, the Court made the right choice in 
invalidating the DSL, but unfortunately left the States with the decision 
of whether to augment the province of the jury or the power of the bench. 
 
 B.  Determinate Sentencing Legislation and the Bench’s Rise, Fall, and 
Rise to Power  
 
While lower courts—which are closer to local realities—struggle to 
decide exactly what to do in light of the ―Supreme Court‘s crude 
doctrines,‖130 legislatures struggle to keep up with the Court‘s dynamic 
precedents. Essentially, Cunningham has created an extreme 
environment in sentencing schemes. Either judges retain unfettered 
 
 123. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 868. 
 124. Id. at 863. 
 125. Id. at 868. 
 126. See id. at 872–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 127. Id. at 872. 
 128. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Berman & Bibas, supra note 5, at 38. 
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discretion in an indeterminate system, or they are utterly subject to the 
statutory range authorized by the jury verdict.
131
 Specifically, the Court 
suggested that states adopt a post-trial hearing where the jury would find 
facts to augment the sentence or grant judges broader discretion within a 
statutory range.
132
 Though the ―ball now lies in [the State legislature‘s] 
court,‖133 the Court has forced the states to choose which polar opposite 
is most attractive to their needs. 
The California legislature chose an extreme route in its reaction to 
Cunningham. In response to the Court‘s decision, California hurriedly 
passed a bill with a January 1, 2009, sunset provision, which allows 
judges to select the upper, middle, or lower term without any factual 
finding.
134
 Thus, Cunningham induced California into a complete judicial 
U-turn. Before the DSL was passed, California judges had unfettered 
discretion to dispense sentences how they wished.
135
 Subsequently, 
California enacted the DSL in order to promote uniformity and limit the 
bench‘s power.136 Ironically, Cunningham invalidated the DSL because it 
granted the judge too much power.
137
 Even more ironically, one of the 
Supreme Court‘s suggestions in the remedial portion of its opinion is to 
grant judges more power.
138
 
Given all of these conflicting messages, it is difficult to predict what 
direction the Court will go next. States will continue to struggle with the 
opposing objectives of sentencing uniformity and proper consideration of 
individual circumstances of each defendant. There was some evidence 
presented in Cunningham which suggested that more states have 
sentencing schemes similar to that invalidated in California than schemes 
giving broad discretion to judges. However, in light of the Court‘s 
whirlwind of contradictory remedial suggestions,
139
 more jurisdictions 
will likely move to liberate their judges from the confines of determinate 
sentencing and away from Sixth Amendment preservation. 
 
 131. Bowman, supra note 9, at *15 (arguing that the rule is inadequate which grants ―judges 
absolute sentencing discretion or none at all‖). 
 132. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 856. 
 133. Id. at 868 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005)). 
 134. See Bill: S.B. 40, 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub 
/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_40_bill_20070125_amended_sen_v98.html (amending CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1170(b)) (visited Feb. 6, 2008). See generally State Sentencing Law Does Not Need 
Drastic Changes—Lawyers, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (May 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.metnews.com/articles/2007/blac053007.htm. 
 135. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 861. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 868; see Gleeson, supra note 4, at 890. 
 138. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871; see Gleeson, supra note 4, at 890. 
 139. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871 (urging legislators to either grant more power to judges or 
to grant more power to juries). 
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Therefore, while the Court‘s constitutional analysis in Cunningham 
is correct, its remedial portion suggesting the re-endowment of power 
upon judges is logically inconsistent—adding to the disorder of the 
already confusing
140
 sentencing restrictions of the Sixth Amendment. 
Indeed, Justice O‘Connor lamented in an earlier opinion, ―What I have 
feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sentencing reform 
are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments are in 
jeopardy.‖141 More disconcerting, is the likelihood that states will move 
away from preserving the jury‘s role in the criminal justice system. A 
wiser approach would be to require state courts to have a separate 
sentencing hearing where the jury could find facts that would augment 
the sentence. 
 
 C.  Painted Into a Corner 
 
Cunningham‘s relation to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines placed 
the Supreme Court on a collision course with defining a reasonableness 
standard of review that will either damage Sixth Amendment precedent 
or destroy what is left of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Neither of 
these options is inviting. To avoid stepping in wet paint in the future, the 
Court will need to fashion a standard of reasonableness review that gives 
viability to determinate sentencing laws, while at the same time, 
remaining completely arbitrary in order to avoid any Sixth Amendment 
problems—a nearly impossible task. Addressing this issue during oral 
arguments of Rita v. United States——the first federal sentencing 
decision since Booker——a frustrated Justice Scalia scolded the helpless 
advocate stating, ―[Y]ou haven‘t solved the problem of the . . . apparent 
conflict . . . .‖142 
In light of Cunningham, if a federal judge imposes a sentence at the 
upper end allowed by the Guidelines, he or she must do so for reasonable 
reasons that do not involve judge-found facts. The core problem with the 
Cunningham decision relates to the Court‘s ―either or‖ approach. Under 
Cunningham, judges must have either unregulated discretion in an 
indeterminate system, or they are completely bound by a statutory range 
authorized by the jury verdict. However, this rule seems irreconcilable 
with Booker, which made the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, 
 
 140. Bowman, supra note 9, at 2. But see United States v. Griffin, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D. 
Mass. 2007) (arguing that Cunningham clarifies the Sixth Amendment analysis). 
 141. Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 336 (2004) (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 142. Oral Argument Transcript, Rita v. United States, Oral Transcript, available at 127 S. Ct. 
2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754) http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_5754/argument/ 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2008) . 
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allowing judges to deviate from them subject to appellate review for 
reasonableness. In light of Cunningham‘s rule, what does ―advisory‖ and 
―review for reasonableness‖ mean? 
If these terms suggest that judges are constrained to some degree by 
the Guidelines, then Cunningham overrules Booker because it would 
effectively put district judges in an intermediate position of discretionary 
sentencing power. In the latest Federal sentencing case, Gall v. United 
States, Justice Alito‘s dissenting opinion suggests that ―sentencing 
judges must still give the Guidelines‘ policy decisions some significant 
weight and that the courts of appeals must still police compliance.‖143 
Yet this is exactly what Cunningham prohibits. The moment a judge 
begins to follow the Guidelines, he or she necessarily engages in fact-
finding. 
If ―advisory‖ and ―review for reasonableness‖ carry little or no 
meaning, then the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are also meaningless. 
Without reasonableness review, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines will 
not be guidelines, but simple suggestions which the judge can vary from 
for any reason without explanation. In other words, the reasonableness 
review is the only doctrine supporting federal determinate sentencing and 
without it, sentencing power will revert back to the bench as in the pre-
Federal Sentencing Guidelines era.
144
 Thus, the reasonableness review is 
essential to the preservation of determinate sentencing in the post-Booker 
and post-Cunningham sentencing world. 
Unfortunately, any attempt by the Court to strengthen the 
reasonableness review or give this doctrine any real weight will result in 
Sixth Amendment violations of judicial fact-finding. If reasonableness 
requires a judge to rely on specific factual bases,
145
 the Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by jury is implicated. If reasonableness simply means that a 
judge did not dispense the sentencing in his sleep,
146
 then the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines become hollow. Thus, if reasonableness review is 
to ―mean something,‖147 judges must be limited by it in some form—in 
violation of Cunningham. 
 
 
 
 
 
 143. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 604 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 144. Bowman, supra note 9, at *6. 
 145. Id. at *3. 
 146. Id. (considering a judge basing the decision on a lottery). 
 147. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 880 n.11 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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 VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, while the Cunningham Court made the right decision 
for Cunningham, it jeopardized thousands of other criminal judgments.
148
 
The effect of its inconsistent remedial holding on the Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by jury will likely be negative. Finally, Cunningham’s 
irresolvable conflict with Booker has created a situation where the Court 
will need to choose between offending the Sixth Amendment and 
destroying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. ―The only sure thing is 
that more change seems inevitable, and that it will be interesting to watch 
it happen.‖149 
Jacob Strain
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